Searle's Aporia

Well, what, then, is the method of logical analysis which gets at these conditions, if it is not just describing the structure of experience? The answer is that it is an extension of the methods of linguistic philosophy. You ask, “What would we say if …?” or “What would be the case if …?” Grice gives a classic instance of this in his proof that there is a causal condition on seeing, even in cases where that causal condition is not experienced as part of the phenomenology of the visual experience. (Grice 1989) Thus, suppose I see an object, but a mirror is then insert-ed in such a way that I have exactly the same type of experience I had before, and I still take myself to be seeing the same object; but, in fact, the mirror image is refl ecting a different but type-identical object. I am no longer seeing the object I was originally seeing because that ob-ject is not causing my visual experience. The proof is that we would not describe this as a case of seeing the original object. This is straight, linguistic philosophy; it is not phenomenological analysis. This is a crucial and decisive distinction between my notion of intentional content and Husserl's notion of noema. The noema can only contain things that are phenomenologically real. On my view, phenomenology is a good beginning on the analysis of intentionality, but it cannot go all the way because there are all sorts of conditions which simply have no immedi-ate phenomenological reality.

Searles Aporia. Instead of a mirror, imagine the mirror is replaced by the Matrix. Searles would have to say he is no longer in the same Reality, as it would be constituted (caused, sic) by "mirrored", that is, simulated objects.  But Searles says there is no question about the Real given his 2 or 3 unquestionable and unquestioned truths about the world. But it is possible that we are living in some sort of simulation and physicists are taking it seriously enough to try to determine whether we could tell from within the simulation. Aporia.

Clearly, Searles does not take the problem of the Matrix seriously. That means he doesn't take fundamental ontology seriously. Also Searles doesn't get Husserlian bracketing if he can assert the 2 or 3 truths as so widely accepted as to be practically unquestionable. Precisely, bracketing is to take this natural standpoint as no longer unquestionable.

Searles paper is a fantastic opportunity to test a Heideggarian understanding of the Gestell, what I call "ontoscientology". His is the clearly expressed "not getting it" of our epoch. Any class in Being and Time should use this article as a vehicle to allow a Heideggarian criticism as a test or assignment.

Not to say that his approaches using various forms of logical analysis aren't extremely valuable as a sort of protoscience, or prescience,, that is,  as an attempt to model various domains. But modeling of this sort does not address fundamental ontology in the Heideggarian sense. Models do not determine fundamental ontology -- fundamentally, fundamental ontology determines models.

To do: Address Searles criticism of Being as a noun. (It may not function as a noun here, but Freges analysis misses the point (as in pointing.)